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Abstract. The use of large fiscal stimulus packages to dampen the impact of Covid-19 recently has raised concerns about 
the effectiveness of the discretionary fiscal policy. This paper aims at analysing the feasibility of automatic fiscal stabilisers 
to mitigate economic fluctuations in the case of Indonesia. Using the IMF standard model for quarterly data over the period 
of 2001(1) to 2019(4), we find that the role of automatic fiscal stabilisers is getting greater both in revenue and spending. 
This implies that the automatic fiscal stabilisers are feasible as the main fiscal policy instrument for economic stability 
goals in the future. However, given the existing circumstances, Indonesia has to reform economic, regulatory, and 
institutional ecosystems in adopting the automatic fiscal stabilisers. 
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Following the Coronavirus disease (Covid-19) outbreak around the world in late 2019, fiscal policy 
has received much attention. Many advanced countries adopt the fiscal stimulus packages 
relative to monetary policy to survive the adverse impacts emerging from Covid-19. For example, 
as of October 2020, member countries of G-20 announced that the fiscal stimulus packages 
ranged from 7 percent of GDP in China to 13 percent of GDP in the US, and more than 21 percent 
of GDP in Japan (Szmigiera, 2020). 
While in developed countries, the role of automatic fiscal stabilisers is very important, it is likely 
less prominent in developing countries (Debrun and Kapoor, 2010). To mitigate the negative 
impacts of the Covid-19 pandemy, emerging market countries rely on the fiscal stimulus packages 
only. The main cause is the revenue to GDP and expenditure to GDP ratios are far smaller than 
that in advanced countries. On the revenue side, the tax base is smaller so that the share of 
income-elastic taxes is smaller. On the expenditure side, there are few automatic stabilisers in 
developing countries (Cornia, 2006). 
For academic circumstances, the above phenomena are interesting. The main question here 
is whether fiscal stimulus packages are really effective to stabilise macroeconomic conditions. 
Despite the lag length to affect, such discretionary fiscal policies potentially lead to procyclical. 
On the one hand, the discretionary fiscal policies which originally are subject to stabilisation can 
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destabilise (Gnip, 2011). Hence, there is considerable debate in the literature about the efficacy 
of discretionary fiscal policy in developing countries (see: Doraisami, 2013). On the other hand, 
the automatic stabilisers -- programs that automatically scale up in recessions and drawdown 
during booms to stabilise the economy -- play a critical role in fighting every recession (Leiserson, 
2020).  
For policymakers, understanding the size and the role of automatic stabilisers is crucial. While 
automatic stabilisers are a fairly established concept in the fiscal policy literature, there is still no 
consensus about their actual nature and their effectiveness (Veld, Larch, and Vandeweyer, 2012). 
This leaves no room for discretionary fiscal policy and highlights the importance of knowing 
whether automatic stabilisers alone can deliver sufficient stabilisation. Reconsidering issues 
arising from discretionary fiscal policies will also help the authority in emerging markets to avoid 
output fluctuation better by using a passive fiscal policy (Vera, 2016).  
Indonesia is not an exception. Since the government officially announced Covid-19 for the first 
time on March 2, 2020, Indonesia launched the first two fiscal packages amounting to IDR 33.2 
trillion (0.2 percent of GDP), the government announced an additional package of IDR 405 trillion 
(2.6 percent of GDP) on March 31, 2020. They were further expanded to IDR 677.2 trillion (4.2 
percent of GDP) on June 4, 2020, as part of a national economic recovery program. The national 
economic recovery program has been continuously refined and currently stands at IDR 695.2 
trillion (UNDDR, 2020).  
At present, Indonesia only has automatic stabilisers in its taxation through progressive income 
tax. The country’s corporate income tax, however, is no longer progressive from 2020 with a 
single rate of 22 percent. On the spending side, the country does not have automatic stabilisers 
yet, as typically the case in developing economies. The inadequate fiscal space, relatively high 
population, and low share of public spending as a share of GDP need more time to implement in 
Indonesia at least within the medium term (Trihartanto, 2019). 
The local governments are still heavily reliant on central government fiscal transfer that covers 
around two-thirds of their budget. Their current aggregate own-source revenue merely stands at 
2.4 percent of GDP. As such, this time seems to be not the perfect time yet for Indonesia to 
provide such benefits or the time being, Indonesia’s fiscal stabilisers still rely on discretionary 
fiscal measures due to its still limited automatic stabilisers. Accordingly, countries with weak 
automatic stabilisers have enacted larger fiscal stimulus programs (Dolls, Fuest, and Peichl, 
2012).  
Regardless of the absence of automatic fiscal stabilisers, Indonesia also has fiscal rules 
discipline (most notably capping fiscal deficit to 3 percent of GDP and debt ratio to 60 percent of 
GDP adopted from Maastricht Pact since 2004). It is unallowed to rely heavily on fiscal expansion 
during the bad times, where unemployment benefits and other social transfers work as automatic 
stabilisers. However, such a fiscal discipline still effectively proves to make Indonesia’s fiscal 
sound so far.  
This paper enriches the literature on fiscal policy in developing countries with a focus on 
Indonesia. We measure the automatic fiscal stabiliser and relate it to the discretionary fiscal 
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policy. Then, we attempt to estimate their role and assess their feasibility in managing the 
economic impact of Covid-19. The lessons learnt from Indonesia would be useful for other 
emerging countries to achieve price stabilisation as well as to promote economic growth. The 
article is organised as follows. In the next section, we briefly present the literature and previous 
empirical researches both in developed countries and developing countries, including Indonesia. 
The third section describes the dataset and empirical techniques used. The results of the 
empirical tests are presented in the results and discussion section. In the end, we summarise 
arguments and key findings in the conclusion section. 
 
2. Literature review 
Basically, a country's fiscal policy has three major economic functions, namely allocation, 
distribution and stabilisation (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989). The allocation function is carried 
out through the state expenditures side, while the distribution and stabilisation functions are 
mostly executed through taxes and expenditures. In principle, the fiscal policy will transfer 
resources from the public to the government and then redistribute them to the public with certain 
considerations (Arestis, 1985). 
At the most basic technical level, the fiscal policy can be categorised into three groups, namely 
automatic fiscal stabilisation, systematic fiscal discretion, and non-systematic fiscal discretion 
(see: Surjaningsih, Utari, and Trisnanto, 2012; Kuncoro, 2017). While automatic fiscal stabilisation 
policies and systematic fiscal discretion are aimed at dampening business cycle fluctuations, the 
non-systematic fiscal discretion is related to changes in government revenues and/or 
expenditures due to apart from the changes in the economic cycle (Fatas and Mihov, 2003). 
Empirical studies regarding the three types of fiscal policy, primarily automatic fiscal 
stabilisers, provide diverging results. On the revenue side, Mabbett and Schelkle (2007) assessed 
the stabilisation effect of the tax system. They found that various tax-benefit instruments vary 
across countries in the EU. However, Suescún (2007) finds that the degree of smoothing provided 
by the automatic revenue stabilisers -- described by various properties of the tax system -- is 
negligible in Latin America.  
Looking at the type of tax revenue, Buettner and Fuest (2010) analysed the effectiveness of 
the corporate income tax as an automatic fiscal stabiliser. By employing a unique firm-level data 
set of German manufacturers, they found that the stabilisation effect varies over the business 
cycle and tends to increase during cyclical downturns. In contrast, Sen (2013), using Granger 
causality test, shows that in the case of Turkey, personal income tax is the most effective tax in 
stabilising business cycle fluctuations. The effectiveness of personal income tax as an automatic 
stabiliser is not because of the progressivity of tax, but due to the sensitivity of employment and 
average wages to GDP fluctuations (Krajewsky and Pilat, 2017). 
Besides income tax, value-added tax (VAT) could be an instrument of automatic fiscal 
stabiliser. The VAT would be more progressive than the payroll tax it replaces because there is 
no ‘taxable maximum’ on a VAT that slashes the effective rate paid by high earners (Ritz, 2020). 
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A VAT is also neutral to the treatment of capital and labour, which means that employers will be 
based on economic benefits for their investment decisions, rather than solely on favourable tax 
treatment (Nunns and Rosenberg, 2016). Hence, the VAT affects indirectly the employed labour’ 
income.  
By comparing US to the EU, Dolls, Fuest, and Peichl (2012) found that, in US, tax-benefit 
systems absorb a greater proportion of income variation generated by income shock than the 
unemployment shock. The difference is largely explained by the coverage and generosity of 
unemployment benefits. Automatic stabilisers in the case of an unemployment shock are basically 
replacement rates for a transition from employment to non-work. Rather than work incentives, 
they reflect how much the tax-benefit system absorbs market income losses due to becoming 
unemployed or exiting the labour market altogether. As a result, the tax-benefit system reduced 
inequality of net incomes, and so helped offset the inequality‐increasing impact of growing 
disparities in gross market incomes (Paulus and Tasseva, 2020). 
On the expenditure side, government size -- measured by the GDP ratio of government 
spending -- plays the role of an automatic stabiliser in developing countries such as Latin America, 
subject to weak smoothing effect (Suescún, 2007). In terms of expenditure type, Darby and Melitz 
(2008) argue that age- and health-related social expenditures react to the cycle in a stabilising 
manner. In contrast, Granado, Gupta, and Hajdenberg (2013) concluded that social spending in 
developed countries is acyclical, implying the ineffectiveness of social spending as automatic 
fiscal stabilisers. In the US, the stabilisers affect welfare significantly through the provision of 
social insurance (McKay and Reis, 2016). 
The macroeconomic literature on automatic fiscal stabilisation tends to focus on taxes and 
dismiss the relevance of government expenditure except for unemployment compensation. For 
instance, Salgado et al. (2014) analysed the distribution of replacement rates when simulating 
the unemployment shock in six EU countries due to the Great Recession. They distinguish 
between short- and long-term unemployment, and their findings confirmed that higher 
replacement rates in the short term could lead to serious challenges for minimum income 
schemes with the consequences of the crisis in the longer term.  
Moreover, Poghosyan, Senhadji, and Cottarelli (2016) found that fiscal transfers smooth 
regional shocks in three large federation countries: the U.S., Canada, and Australia. They find 
that fiscal transfers offset 4-11 percent of idiosyncratic shocks (risk-sharing) and 13-24 percent of 
permanent shocks (redistribution). This fiscal insurance largely operates through automatic 
stabilisers embedded in a central budget, primarily through federal taxes and transfers to 
individuals, rather than transfers from the central government to state budgets.  
The analysis of the role of automatic fiscal stabilisation in the various forms of social protection 
in reducing economic shocks has been discussed by Estep, Ajilore, and  Madowitz (2019). 
Caldara et al. (2020) also concluded that various social protection programs in the US are 
effective in reducing the impact of an economic recession. However, the adoption of those various 
social protection programs for the case of developing countries such as Indonesia needs further 
adjustments due to differences in terms of economic, regulatory, and institutional ecosystems. 
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Hence, there is a need for further research on this issue, especially from Indonesian case. 
Whereas, Indonesian fiscal policy tends to be more a-cyclical or even procyclical. The a-cyclicality 
of fiscal policy leads to the presumption of the role of automatic fiscal stabilisers, while the 
procyclicality of fiscal policy further leads to the role of fiscal discretion, due to the fact that 
scholars found that there was no counter-cyclicality in fiscal policy (Baldacci, 2009; Akitoby et al., 
2004). 
In terms of discretionary fiscal policy, Simorangkir and Adamanti (2010) evaluated the 
effectiveness of fiscal stimulus in accordance with the global financial crisis. Using a financial 
computable general equilibrium approach, they revealed the combination of fiscal expansion 
without monetary policy expansion and monetary expansion without fiscal expansion. They infer 
that the combination of fiscal and monetary expansion has a large multiplier effect, which 
increases aggregate demand. 
On the other hand, Surjaningsih, Utari, and Trisnanto (2012) indicated the absence of 
discretionary fiscal policy made by the government of Indonesia. Their study also concluded that 
short-term adjustment suggests that an increase in government spending has a positive effect on 
output, while a tax increase has a negative effect. There is a greater influence of government 
spending on output compared to taxation policies in the short term. Therefore, government 
spending is more effective to stimulate economic growth, especially in times of recession, 
compared to taxation policies.  
Furthermore, Hur, Mallick, and Park, (2014) found similar results. The fiscal stimulus programs 
have contributed substantially to developing Asia’s countries (including Indonesia) faster and 
stronger than expected recovery from the global financial crisis. Basri and Raharja (2011) suggest 
improving the quality of spending in controlling fiscal deficits. To contribute greatly in economic 
stabilisation, fiscal space can be maintained by converting unproductive spending into productive 
spending. Abdurohman and Resosudarmo (2017) investigated the practical behaviour of fiscal 
policy in Indonesia in response to economic cycles. They showed that fiscal policy in Indonesia 
tends to be procyclical. 
Recently, Resosudarmo et al. (2020) discovered that fiscal stimulus packages during the 
global financial crisis had a positive impact on aggregate demand and on poverty prevention, 
principally via stimulating private consumption. Corporate income tax cuts have the largest 
economic impact in the long run, and cash transfers are the most useful policy tool for alleviating 
poverty. However, a fiscal stimulus package could have an uneven spatial distributional effect on 
output across regions, particularly in the short term. 
According to prior literature, Indonesia tends to support discretionary fiscal policy instead of 
automatic fiscal stabilisers to overcome economic turbulence. In addition, most of the studies 
above are done in various circumstances. Therefore, there is no general conclusion, which 
requires further investigations. The procyclicality of fiscal policy in Indonesia opens room to 
implement automatic stabilisers alongside fiscal discretion. In particular, designing better 
automatic stabilisers is one of the most promising routes for better macroeconomic policy 
(Blanchard, Dell'Ariccia, and Mauro, 2010). 
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3. Analytical model and data 
The purpose of this section is to develop an analytical framework within which this can be clearly 
stated as a set of formal propositions. The notion of government budget constraint proposes that 
the total government spending (Exp) should be sufficiently financed by the total domestic 
revenues (Rev). If Rev is inadequate to cover Exp, the available financing option is debt, resulting 
in interest payment (IRP) in the next period. 
The overall fiscal balance (i.e. deficits or surpluses) is the difference between Rev and Exp: 
 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸    [1] 
 
When IRP is excluded from the total government expenditure, we get the primary fiscal 
balance (PB):  
 
𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 − 𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃).   [2a] 
Then, 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = 𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂 − 𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃   [2b] 
 
Looking solely at changes in the fiscal balance can thus be misleading: these movements may 
give an impression of expansionary (or contractionary) discretionary policy actions, even though 
the changes are driven by cyclical factors. This is why cyclical adjustment is applied, to filter the 
impact of cyclical movements on fiscal variables and assess the ‘underlying’ fiscal stance. 
Following the OECD methodology (Giorno et al., 1995), the primary fiscal balance may be 
decomposed into the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) and the cyclical primary balance 
(CPB): 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂 + 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂   [3] 
 
The CPB is the part of the primary balance that automatically reacts to the cycle. Interest 
payments are often kept separate because of their movements, while ‘automatic’ in the sense of 
not generally reflecting discretionary fiscal policy actions. They may not be necessarily correlated 
with cyclical output changes. 
From [2b] and [3], changes in the OB can be decomposed into: (i) the automatic response of 
fiscal variables to changes in output; (ii) the response of fiscal variables to changes in 
discretionary policy; and (iii) changes in interest payments, as follows:  
 
∆𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂 + ∆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂 − ∆𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃      [4] 
 
where Δ is the difference between two consecutive years, t and t+1 (or the difference relative to 
a reference year).  
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Eventually, the automatic stabilisers (AS) are defined as the change in the cyclical primary 
balance: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 = ∆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂 = ∆𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 − ∆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂 + ∆𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃  [5] 
 
The change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance can be derived from cyclically adjusted 
revenue and expenditure. In particular, the cyclically adjusted component of revenue RevCA is 
defined as 
 





   [6] 
 
where Yp is potential output (that is, the maximum output compatible, at any given time, with the 
absence of unexpected inflation), Y is actual output, and εR is the elasticity of revenue with respect 
to the output gap. 
 
Similarly, the cyclically adjusted component of expenditure ExpCA is defined as  
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Subtracting [6] and [7], we obtain the cyclically adjusted primary balance  
 










     [9] 
 
The cyclically adjusted primary balance is often measured in relation to potential output − the 
“natural” scaling variable since cyclically adjusted balances measure what the fiscal balance 






















  [10a] 
 
where gap is the output gap and small letters r and g denote ratios of revenue and expenditure 
to GDP while small letter for capb denotes the ratio of cyclically adjusted primary balance to 
potential GDP 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐 = 𝑟𝑟(1 + 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸)−(𝜀𝜀𝑅𝑅−1) −  𝑅𝑅(1 + 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸)−(𝜀𝜀𝐸𝐸−1)   [10b] 
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This expression captures the “structural” primary balance i.e. primary balance not affected by 









= 𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐 − 𝑐𝑐𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐  [11a] 
𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐 = 𝑟𝑟(𝜀𝜀𝑅𝑅 − 1)𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸 − 𝑅𝑅(𝜀𝜀𝐸𝐸 − 1)𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝐸𝐸   [11b] 
 
where pb and cpb are the primary balance and the cyclical primary balance in percent of actual 
GDP. The contribution from automatic stabilisers to changes in the overall balance is then given 




= ∆𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡−1   [12] 
 
To identify potential output, we adopt Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtering method. This method is 
widely used among macroeconomists to obtain a smooth estimate of the long-term trend 
component of a series. The method was first used in a working paper (circulated in the early 
1980’s and published in 1997) by Hodrick and Prescott (1997) to analyse postwar US business 
cycles.  
Technically, the HP filter is a two-sided linear filter that computes the smoothed series τ of y 
by minimising the variance y of around τt, subject to a penalty that constrains the second 
difference of τ. The HP filter then chooses s to minimise: 
 
∑ (𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 − 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡)2𝑇𝑇1 + 𝜆𝜆∑ [(𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡) − (𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 − 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡−1)]2𝑇𝑇−12  [13] 
 
The penalty parameter λ controls the smoothness of the series τ. The larger the λ, the 
smoother the τ. As λ = ∞, τ approaches a linear trend. The default value of λ in Eviews is set to 
be 1,600 for quarterly data. 
For this empirical study, we define Rev ∈ {IT, VAT, Others} and Exp ∈ {CEX, REX, IRP}. IT is 
income tax, VAT is value added tax, and Others is other government revenues. CEX is central 
government expenditures, REX is government transfers to lower-layer governments, and IRP is 
interest payments, respectively. 
The government revenue is divided into two grand categories, taxes and non-taxes received 
excluded grants. The term ‘government expenditure’ used in this study is central government 
general consumption or recurrent expenditure realisation (mostly allocated onto wage/salary and 
goods/services purchase) and capital expenditure. Inclusively, we also assess the spending of 
transfer to regions. Deficits are the difference between government spending and government 
revenues. The fiscal data are taken from the Ministry of Finance. 
The selected key macroeconomic variable is GDP. The GDP is used as the main factor for the 
government to set the state budget projection for the next year. The GDP data is available on a 
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quarter-basis. Those variables are presented at the 2010 constant price. Price levels are derived 
from the GDP in current price divided by GDP in constant prices (2010=1). The deflator index is 
also used to convert all variables into real values. The sample periods chosen for this study extend 
from 2001(1) to 2019(4). The total observation is 76 sample points. The year 2001 is set as the 
starting observation related to the implementation of fiscal decentralisation. All of the data are 
taken from the Central Bank of Indonesia and the Central Board of Statistics. Most of the results 
are calculated in the econometric program Eviews 9. Price levels are derived from the GDP in 
current price divided by GDP in constant prices (2010=1). The deflator index is also used to 
convert all variables into real values. 
 
 
4. Results and discussion 
 
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics covering mean, median, and extreme (maximum and 
minimum) values for each variable of interest. The average shares of income tax and other 
revenue are not far from each other. Nevertheless, other revenue is more volatile compared to 
income tax as presented by the higher standard deviation as well as the range of two extreme 
values. The share of value- added tax to total revenue is relatively low but stable indicated by the 
lowest standard of deviation. The highest kurtosis and the negative sign of skewness suggest that 
value-added tax has a big potential to be the main automatic fiscal stabiliser tool.  
Central government spending absorbs almost half of total expenditure. This is followed by 
transfer to regions which takes 37 percent. The rest of total expenditure is allocated to interest 
payment. Special attention should be paid more to the interest payment since this outlay tends to 
remarkably increase in recent years. While most of the central government expenditure is 
mandatory spending, the tight fiscal space (represented by an increase in primary balance 
deficits) is primarily due to the increase in interest payment. 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. 
 Revenue Expenditure OB 
Ratio  IT VAT Others CEX REX IRP 
 Mean 0.3794 0.2418 0.3787 0.4959 0.3676 0.1366 -0.2695 
 Median 0.3856 0.2499 0.3582 0.4939 0.3716 0.1169 -0.2328 
 Maximum 0.5206 0.2999 0.6121 0.6824 0.5356 0.3600 0.5744 
 Minimum 0.1883 0.1142 0.2347 0.2533 0.1962 0.0609 -1.0479 
 Std. Dev. 0.0679 0.0350 0.0906 0.1048 0.0813 0.0665 0.0351 
 Skewness -0.3207 -0.9323 0.5231 -0.2041 0.0753 1.6285 -0.3571 








Figure 1. Output Gap and Overall Balance Ratio. 
 
Figure 1 presents the dynamics of the output gap and overall balance deficit ratio. Output gap 
was low in the early 2000s, associated with the diminishing impacts of the 1997/1998 Asian 
monetary crisis. Output gap tended to be high, approximately 4 percent, in accordance with the 
2009 global financial crisis. Figure 1 shows that fiscal policy in Indonesia during the sample 
observation periods is typically a-cyclical, as found by Akitoby et al. (2004) and Baldacci (2009). 
This figure will be confirmed by the statistical result. 
The overall balance budget ranges from (deficit) -1.05 to (surplus) 0.6 percent of GDP. The 
lowest deficit ratio took place in 2012 when the commodity boom began. The highest overall deficit 
ratio occurred in the mid-2010s when the commodity boom ended. It seems that the government 
revenue is strongly dependent on some external factors. Therefore, implementing pro-growth, 
pro-job, and pro-poor fiscal measures is likely to require an increase in the size of the government 
revenue. 
The above results implicitly offer some fundamental implications. The government can use the 
output gap of plus/minus 5 percent as the preliminary reference for carrying out the active fiscal 
policy. The active fiscal policy might be conducted through either fiscal discretion or automatic 
fiscal stabilisers. Each of these policies will be described further in the next section. 
According to Sen (2013), Granger causality can be explored to test the ability of a particular 
revenue to be an automatic fiscal stabiliser. Table 2 reports the standard Granger causality test 
results for the three types of revenues. Since the Granger causality test is very sensitive to the 
selection of lag lengths, the lag lengths are determined by Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). 
Standard Granger causality test results show that there is a bi-directional causality in all three 
revenue categories. It means that all revenues prospectively could be an automatic fiscal 
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Table 2. Causality Test of Revenue and Expenditure to GDP. 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Stat Prob. 
 D(Log(Y)) does not Granger Cause D(Log(IT)) 
73 
10.1578 0.0001 
 D(Log(IT)) does not Granger Cause D(Log(Y)) 8.1725 0.0007 
 D(Log(Y)) does not Granger Cause D(Log(VAT)) 
73 
24.7563 0.0000 
 D(Log(VAT)) does not Granger Cause D(Log(Y)) 19.5834 0.0000 
 D(Log(Y)) does not Granger Cause D(Log(Others)) 
73 
56.5161 0.0000 
 D(Log(Others)) does not Granger Cause D(Log(Y)) 44.0929 0.0000 
 D(Log(Y)) does not Granger Cause D(Log(CEX)) 
73 
59.6569 0.0000 
 D(Log(CEX)) does not Granger Cause D(Log(Y)) 46.3288 0.0000 
 D(Log(Y)) does not Granger Cause D(Log(REX)) 
73 
15.8953 0.0000 
 D(Log(REX)) does not Granger Cause D(Log(Y)) 17.5873 0.0000 
 D(Log(Y)) does not Granger Cause D(Log(IRP)) 
73 
16.2580 0.0000 
 D(Log(IRP)) does not Granger Cause D(Log(Y)) 14.8332 0.0000 
 
 
Similar results are found in the context of spending. There is a bi-directional Granger causality 
between GDP and all of the three types of expenditure. The larger spending exerted by the 
government, the higher the GDP. The higher GDP requires the government to spend more to 
facilitate economic activities. They imply further that inducing the government spending can act 
as an automatic fiscal stabiliser, particularly in the time of recessions since Granger Causality test 
runs from government spending to GDP, which are considered in this study. 
The first estimation of equations (6) and (7) using the log-linear model, unfortunately, did not 
yield fiscal variables elasticity with respect to output gap as expected by the results of previous 
studies. The NLLS (nonlinear least squares) model approach also produces similar results. The 
elasticity of the fiscal variable with respect to output gap even gives a negative sign and 
insignificant coefficient. For this reason, equations (6) and (7) are modified by assuming the 
elasticity of the fiscal variable to actual output is equal to unity. Within this assumption, the 
elasticity of the fiscal variable is calculated with respect to potential output, instead of the output 
gap. 
Table 3 provides elasticity of fiscal variables with respect to potential output. The parameter 
estimates indicate that value-added tax (0.98) is the most effective tax in stabilising business 
cycle fluctuations. The second most effective tax is the income tax (0.94). In line with the prior 
researches, we expect that income tax should be the most effective tax and has a positive effect 
on the business cycle fluctuations. It seems that in the case of Indonesia, income tax (consisting 
of corporate and personal) could act as an automatic fiscal stabiliser mostly due not to the 
progressive tax rates, but because of the sensitivity of employment to GDP fluctuations. This 
confirms Krajewsky and Pilat (2017). 
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Table 3. Potential Output Elasticity. 
Revenue Elasticity Expenditure Elasticity 
IT 0.9393 CEX 0.9065 
VAT 0.9809 REX 1.1907 
Others 0.2769 IRP 0.1546 
Total 0.6695 Total 0.8457 
 
On the spending side, transfer to regions is the most effective expenditure (1.2) in stabilising 
the business cycle fluctuations. The second most effective spending is the central government 
expenditures (0.91). Those results make sense. Since 2001, fiscal responsibilities between 
central and local governments have been more clearly defined. The fiscal decentralisation and 
regional autonomy turned into an additional source of central government expenditure to fulfil the 
vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances. These imply that various compensations and social 
protection programs can be well distributed either through central government spending or 
transfer to regions. 
Figure 2 explains further the magnitude of automatic fiscal stabilisers and fiscal discretion 
policy which are derived from Table 3 and Figure 1. The automatic fiscal stabilisers appeared to 
be very high in 2005 in relation to the changes in budgetary regulation. After that, the size of 
automatic fiscal stabilisers is relatively stable, which rises and falls within the plus/minus 0.4 
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The magnitude of systematic fiscal discretion was notably very high in 2005 and during the 
2009 global financial crisis. The release of the new Taxation Law in 2008 has triggered the size 
of systematic fiscal discretion largely. Overall, the size of automatic fiscal stabilisers is greater 
than that of systematic fiscal discretion. However, the government consistently uses both 
automatic fiscal stabilisers and systematic fiscal discretion to manage macroeconomic 
performance through the state budget deficit. 
When we break it down into two sub-periods of observation, the conclusion does not change. 
Table 4 summarises the automatic fiscal stabilisers contribution of each revenue side and 
expenditure side derived from equation (12). The contribution of automatic fiscal stabilisers from 
the revenue side reached 0.21, with automatic stabilisers of income tax having the largest 
contribution (0.11). Meanwhile, the automatic fiscal stabilisers contribution from the spending side 
reached 0.31. The contribution of automatic fiscal stabilisers in terms of central government and 
transfer to regions expenditures are almost the same, for about 0.17.  
In general, the contribution of automatic fiscal stabilisers is getting bigger. This conclusion is 
in contrast to Boone and Buti (2019), who obtained empirical evidence that automatic fiscal 
stabilisers in developed countries are economically weak. The increase in contribution indicates 
that automatic fiscal stabilisers have a big potential to be the main fiscal weapon for economic 
stability goals. This finding is in accordance with the IMF's suggestion (Baunsgaard and 
Symansky, 2009; Spilimbergo et al., 2010). Based on those results, we conclude that automatic 
fiscal stabilisers are potentially implemented to fight the current economic fluctuations induced by 
Covid-19. 
 
Table 4 Contribution of Automatic Fiscal Stabilisers. 
 Revenue Expenditure 
Period Total IT VAT Others Total CEX REX IRP 
2001-09 0.1178 0.0560 0.0372 0.0217 0.1580 0.0939 0.0694 0.0039 
2010-19 0.2154 0.1195 0.0826 0.0305 0.3118 0.1737 0.1657 0.0059 
2001-19 0.1950 0.1063 0.0731 0.0287 0.2797 0.1571 0.1456 0.0054 
Note. Processed from Table 1 and 3. 
 
The following sections focus more on automatic fiscal stabilisers. The comparison of the 
effectiveness between automatic fiscal stabilisers and fiscal discretion policy is summarised in 
Table 5. The automatic fiscal stabilisers are negatively related to the primary balance budget 
deficit and the overall balance budget deficit ratios. Since both the primary balance and the overall 
balance are deficits (have minus signs), the correlation should be understood in the opposite 
direction. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction that automatic stabilisers will increase 
the deficit during the downturns, and, vice versa, they narrow the budget deficit during the 
upswings (Trihartanto, 2019). Meanwhile, automatic fiscal stabilisers have a negative correlation 
with the output gap. This means that the automatic stabilisers component can be properly 
operated if the potential output is greater than the actual output. 
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The discretionary fiscal component, as found in the automatic fiscal stabilisers, is positively 
correlated to the primary balance budget deficit and the overall balance budget deficit, and 
negatively to the output gaps. These support the above analysis that the government uses both 
automatic fiscal stabilisers and systematic fiscal discretion to manage macroeconomic 
performance. However, since the correlation of automatic fiscal stabilisers to GDP is greater than 
that of discretionary fiscal components, we find that automatic fiscal stabilisers are more effective 
to overcome recessions. 
Furthermore, the primary balance budget deficit and the overall balance budget deficit are 
associated with output gaps in the same direction. Since they represent the fiscal stance, this 
study discovers that the Indonesian fiscal policy is characterised by procyclical or even a-cyclical. 
The procyclicality of fiscal policy tends to induce deficit bias which demands non-systematic 
discretionary fiscal policy instead of automatic fiscal stabilisers or systematic discretionary fiscal 
policy. Eventually, the relatively low stabilisation component of fiscal policy is claimed to be the 
main cause of fiscal stimulus policies to be large and expensive (Dolls, Fuest, and Peichl, 2012). 
 
Table 5 Correlation Matrix, 2001-2019. 
 AS DP PBR OBR GAP 
AS 1.0000 0.7553 -0.4431 -0.5183 -0.6159 
DP 0.7553 1.0000 -0.3032 -0.3356 -0.8305 
PBR -0.4431 -0.3032 1.0000 0.8637 0.2916 
OBR -0.5183 -0.3356 0.8637 1.0000 0.2821 
GAP -0.6159 -0.8305 0.2916 0.2821 1.0000 
Note.       AS = automatic fiscal stabilizer   OBR = Overall balance to GDP ratio 
DP = Discretionary fiscal policy   GAP = Output gap between actual  




5.  Conclusions 
 
The use of large fiscal stimulus packages to dampen the impact of Covid-19 recently has raised 
concerns about the effectiveness of the discretionary fiscal policy. While the role of automatic 
fiscal stabilisers is very important in developed countries, it is likely less prominent in developing 
countries. Automatic fiscal stabilisers – which can be described as a built-in response of public 
finance by scaling up and drawing down automatically to economic fluctuations – play a critical 
role in fighting every recession. 
This paper aims at analysing the feasibility of automatic fiscal stabilisers to mitigate economic 
fluctuations in the case of Indonesia. Using the IMF standard model for quarterly data over the 
period of 2001(1) to 2019(4), we find that the role of automatic fiscal stabilisers is getting greater 
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both in the revenues and spendings. Compared to systematic fiscal discretion, the automatic fiscal 
stabiliser is more effective to overcome business cycles. In other words, the automatic fiscal 
stabiliser is feasible as the main fiscal policy instrument for economic stability goals in the future, 
including the current economic fluctuations induced by Covid-19.  
Eventually, this research suggests that Indonesia’s government should immediately install 
automatic fiscal stabilisers in its long-term grand fiscal policy. However, given the existing 
circumstances, Indonesia should reform its economic, regulatory, and institutional ecosystems in 
adopting completely automatic fiscal stabilisers. Without initiating the use of automatic fiscal 
stabilisers permanently, Indonesia will always tend to rely on the non-systematic discretionary 
fiscal policy in the form of fiscal stimulus in anticipating any unexpected recessions. 
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